Abstract
The War in Afghanistan has displayed two very powerful elements of our nation's war chest.
The combination of Special Operations Forces and joint air forces decisively repulsed the outlaw Taliban. Synthesizing SOF and combat airpower is a transformation in the operational art of employing forces. American military experiences over the last decade, influenced by political constraints and a seeming desire by the American public to minimize friendly combatant and enemy non-combatant casualties, have forced our leadership to rethink the introduction of provocative large troop formations on foreign soil. In consequence, policy makers have chosen to depart significantly from land-centric strategies of warfare, turning instead to the global reach and precision engagement of joint air power as the method for projecting our nation's influence.
American involvement in major military actions since the end of Operation Desert Storm has been focused primarily on air and space resources directed and controlled by the Joint Forces Air Component Commander. In Afghanistan, air power was significantly enhanced by unconventional forces on the ground. Meanwhile, forces of our ad hoc coalition partners have born the brunt of high intensity force-on-force land battles. The most recent example of this method for employing forces is the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan. In Central Asia, the forces providing terminal attack control, laser guidance, and target surveillance have been Special Operations Forces, CIA operatives, and indigenous coalition land forces. These are proving to be extremely effective ad hoc arrangements. This study examines the transformation of the American way of war and how to efficiently employ SOF and CIA operatives at the operational level in support of an air-centric operation. Meanwhile, forces of our coalition partners have fought the ensuing high intensity force-onforce land battles.
The most recent example of this method for employing forces is the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom clearly illustrates the thesis of this paper: integrating highly mobile, technically equipped, and digitally linked unconventional ground forces into combat air operations while using proxy armies to engage enemy fielded forces has fundamentally transformed the American way of war. This method is a militarily thrifty response to the nation's desire to quickly and decisively defeat opponents on the battlefield while limiting casualties of friendly forces and innocent civilians.
This conclusion was reached by assessing the emerging synergy between airpower, SOF, and CIA operatives in major combat operations since the Persian Gulf War. SOF command and control (C2) arrangements will be discussed in light of recent operational practices and the paper will conclude with recommendations to enhance further integration of unconventional forces into future combat air operations.
BACKGROUND: FROM VIETNAM TO AFGHANISTAN
Neither airpower nor SOF center on the systems or personnel of any one service.
The synergistic combination of joint operations will be essential to future military operations. Trail. In a crude version of the system in use today, their inputs were fed into "the infiltration surveillance system code-named Task Force Alpha…the resulting intelligence became part of a targeting process that moved rapidly from an assessment officer manning a scope to another targeting process that moved rapidly from an assessment officer manning a scope to another officer who directed the airborne command post and called in strikes on specific targets." 5 4 It can be argued whether or not the strategic bombing campaign of World War II over Europe was in support of, or independent from, land force objectives. For this paper, the author will accept the argument that the bombing campaign was supportive of the overall theater commander's objectives. The full details of the covert support the KLA received from NATO countries are still unclear, but at least the US and Britain seem to have provided the KLA with training, aid, and equipment to both blow up Serbian targets in the field and to provide NATO aircraft with targeting data. US and British intelligence and Special Forces seem to have operated out of Albania, and other countries may have provided covert support as well…NATO began such covert support almost immediately after the start of the air and missile campaign, that the CIA had a major support mission based in Tirana, Albania, and that 24 US Army Special Forces provided the KLA with training assis tance….
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The synergy between the KLA and NATO was reinforced as the KLA helped provide targeting data, taking on the role as possible elements of NATO Special Forces by becoming forward air controllers.
11 SHAPE sources reported that the KLA increasingly acted as the equivalent of forward air controllers, greatly aiding in supplementing the targeting data provided by UAVs and JSTARS. 12 The effect of their assistance was seen in the reduction of collateral damage incidents in the latter months of the campaign.
As the air war progressed into the early summer months, NATO explored a ground option by taking advantage of a covert relationship between the CIA and the KLA to probe Serb ground defenses. 13 The Kosovar Albanian guerillas eventually launched a counteroffensive from Albania against Serb military forces in the Kosovo Engagement Zone.
They used cell phones to call their commanders in Albania who passed on their air support requests and target locations to the NATO CAOC in Vicenza, Italy. KLA actions forced the Serb Army to mass formations and expose their locations where they would be less difficult to detect and more easily engaged by NATO attack and bomber aircraft after Serbia's air defense had become less of a threat.
Airpower's limited ability to destroy enemy fielded forces and mobile targets on the battlefield was identified in after action reports from both the Persian Gulf War and the The Air Force Chief of Staff recently pointed out that the early air campaign was "the very best example of joint warfare going on today…Special Forces teams on the ground helped spot targets and avoid collateral damage." authorized by the NCA to deploy into the CENTCOM Theater during the Persian Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf reminded him, "I also want you to be sure you know who you are working for, and it isn't General Stiner (Army General Carl Stiner, former USCINCSOC). The command structure for a SOF centric operation is clean and simple. SOF may offer a more surgical effect than current air delivered weapons can deliver. The JFACC may have targets that require specific damage effects (or the limitation of collateral damage) beyond the capabilities of precision-guided munitions. These may include the destruction of weapons of mass destruction or their production facilities without the spread of deadly contaminants. SOF have unique capabilities that can enhance joint aerospace operations. For example, SOF aircraft can deliver the 15,000 pound BLU-82 bomb for psychological effect or to create an instant helicopter landing zone.
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There may be alternate command and control structures that could streamline SOF integration into an air-centric campaign. These arrangements would centralize decision making with the commander that has conducted the majority of operations in the last two major campaigns undertaken by the American military. This method would resemble an arrangement described in Air Force Doctrine Document 2 for SOF aviation assets: "The JFC may assign control of SOF aviation forces to either a Service or a functional component commander. When SOF air assets are employed as part of joint SOF operations, the JFC may assign control of those forces to the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC). However, if SOF aviation assets are assigned primarily in support of the theater air operation, then the JFC may assign control of those assets to the JFACC." SOF may enhance joint air operations with unique personnel and platform capabilities, such as providing a tailored joint special operations task force, under the TACON of the JFACC, to assist in locating deep targets. 25 These ad hoc arrangements between airpower, intelligence agency operatives, and SOF ground forces need to be further explored. organizational templates. In air-centric operations, unity of effort must take precedence over perceived service or functional primacy.
SOF perform multiple missions in the theater that do not directly impact the air operation. It is therefore incumbent upon the JFACC to rely on the JSOAC and SOLE for their invested experience and advice on the proper employment and ops tempo of the Special Tactics and Special Forces teams on the ground.
Not every conflict the US engages in will we have the opportunity to make use of indigenous forces to do the high-intensity fighting. In the event we have to use our own ground forces, the battlefield will have to be overwhelmingly prepared by the synergistic effects of airpower with SOF assistance before committing large numbers of American ground forces. Should the U.S. be forced to enter a mature fight, amid modern SAM threats, and without the advantage of a six month buildup period, asymmetric stealth airpower enhanced by near real-time UAV and satellite battlefield intelligence will have to be relied on to delay and disrupt enemy forces in conjunction with friendly maneuvers.
Lastly, some will argue that it isn't SOF supporting airpower, but just the opposite.
Unfortunately, SOF insertions into Afghanistan did not vanquish the terrorizing enemy forces. On the contrary, the initial "staged-for-television" Army Ranger airborne raid on a supposedly poorly-defended airfield in late October was met with stiff resistance. 27 It was the ferocity of weaponry that rained down from the skies that sent Taliban forces fleeing for their lives. SOF have been highly effective enablers that made each bomb dropped by an airman count. The effects of seeing the lead Toyota SUV filled with fellow Taliban fighters explode in a ball of fire must have been extremely painful--physically and mentally--for enemy combatants to witness. Bombing works.
RECOMMENDATIONS
SOF must continue to integrate their roles into conventional missions. Integration is crucial because air assets and SOF are the only forces that routinely operate deep in enemy territory. 28 The ability of military forces to communicate and operate seamlessly on the battlefield will be critical to success. 29 Joint Vision 2020 states "command and control will remain the primary integrating and coordination function for operational capabilities…there is a need to evaluate continually the nature of command and control organization, mechanisms, systems, and tools. 30 The following recommendations are based on an analysis of the current integration of SOF into joint air campaign planning and execution:
u Future JFCs should adopt a version of the C2 arrangement described in Figure 3 whereby biases that have hampered previous attempts at integrating joint air assets will have to be overcome to realize closer coordination between agencies.
v JFCs should establish an objective based parameter drawn from campaign phasing that determines when the JFACC would transfer authority of SOF assets to the JSOCC.
During the halt and battlefield prep phase of the operation, the JSOACC can act as a conduit between the JFACC and the JSOCC for autonomous SOF operations requiring the JFACC to relinquish TACON of SOF air and/or ground forces for specific missions or periods of time.
Having the JSOACC collocated with the JFACC staff would allow him to seamlessly integrate non-SOF aerospace assets into any SOF-centric mission the SECDEF, USSOCOM, or the JFC desired. capability to relay near real-time intelligence and target coordinates to airborne attack aircraft so they can be serviced at an overpowering tempo unseen in previous conflicts.
The traditional American way of war has been to overwhelm our enemies with massive troop formations supported by massive national mobilization and logistics. This "new" opportunity to employ surrogate forces to fight the land battles may not be the first time these elements have been seen in history. For nearly three hundred years Great Britain maintained an expansive empire by relying on a small, professional army and a strong, power projecting navy, while relying on mercenary and allied armies to fight her land battles. She invested in small, high-payoff forces, like heavily armed cavalryman of the Dragoon regiments and the mounted Scotts Greys. Great Britain couldn't afford the losses in manpower expected during the levee en masse campaigns fighting against Napoleon on the European Continent.
Today we see America adopting a 300-year old strategy to avert combat casualties.
While surrogate armies duke it out on the fields of fire, she invests in high payoff, risk reducing, and economy of force weapons with great power projection capabilities to achieve the strategic and operational objectives.
Potential adversaries will continue to employ unconventional approaches to circumvent or undermine U.S. and allied strengths and exploit our vulnerabilities. 35 Our response for the foreseeable future will continue to be the range, mobility, and flexibility joint airpower systems provide. This method of force application maintains a relatively benign environment for U.S. forces, while achieving a new level of battlefield dominance by attacking the enemy directly, decisively, and in parallel across the three spectrums of warfare with aerospace 34 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office), 21. 35 Cordesman, 265. power. Implementing the recommendations of this paper will allow military commanders to meet the numerous challenges in conflicts of both today and tomorrow. 
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